

Message Text

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09525 01 OF 02 190738Z

11

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14 AEC-11

AECE-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 /149 W

----- 027682

O R 190705Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 632

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9525

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: TEXT OF PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE
PROPOSALS BY US REPRESENTATIVE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF US PRESENTATION DESIGNED TO
ACCOMPANY TABLING OF ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL
(TEXT IN VIENNA 9511 NOTAL). TEXT OF US PRESENTATION
HAS BEEN REVISED PURSUANT TO DISCUSSION IN AD HOC
GROUP TO CONFORM WITH LANGUAGE USED IN OUTLINE OF
FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. IT MAY BE REVISED SLIGHTLY IN
AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 19 AND WOULD OF
COURSE BE FURTHER REVISED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
CHANGES MADE IN COURSE OF NAC APPROVAL OF FRAMEWORK
PROPOSAL. BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT

PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE PROPOSALS BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE
SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09525 01 OF 02 190738Z

1. BEGINNING WITH THE OPENING SESSIONS OF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS AND MORE PARTICULARLY IN THE SESSIONS OF
NOVEMBER 13 AND 15, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE PRESENTED
OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES

AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THEN EXPLORED THE SOLUTIONS WE PROPOSE TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM.

2. TODAY, ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, I WISH TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS OF OUR PREVIOUS PRESENTATIONS AND PRESENT OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THESE PROPOSALS WILL CONTRIBUTE IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL CONCERNED. AND THEY RESPOND TO THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

4. THE REDUCTION AREA SHOULD COMPRISE THE TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS AND POLAND. WE CONTINUE TO RESERVE OUR RIGHT TO RAISE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES.

5. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ELEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY ARE OF DECISIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE. WITHOUT THEM, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, TERRITORIES CAN NEITHER BE SEIZED NOR HELD, NEITHER INVADDED NOR DEFENDED. IT IS ONLY BY ADDRESSING GROUND FORCES THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH THE MAJOR DISPARITIES MAKING FOR INSTABILITIES IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. THUS, IT IS NOT ONLY LOGICAL BUT ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT WE
SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09525 01 OF 02 190738Z

FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES IF WE ARE TO ACCOMPLISH THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE REDUCTION AREA, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. EACH SIDE SHOULD REDUCE ITS ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA TO THE SAME AGREED LOWER LEVEL OF MANPOWER. THIS IS WHAT WE MEAN BY A COMMON CEILING. A COMMON CEILING WOULD CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BY ELIMINATING THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE

MANPOWER.

7. TAKING APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY WILL INCLUDE ADDRESSING THE DISPARITY IN TANKS -- A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND A SOURCE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US.

8. THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. THIS CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 7000,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION BELOW PRESENT MANPOWER LEVELS. HOWEVER, NEITHER SIDE NEED FEAR THAT ITS SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED. AT A LEVEL OF ABOUT 700,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ON EACH SIDE, THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD REMAIN SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE FIRM ASSURANCE OF THE ABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK. MOREOVER, IN A NEW AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, STABILITY WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED AND THIS WOULD BE A FAIR AND EQUITABLE RESULT.

9. REDUCTIONS TO THE AGREED COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. THIS WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROCEED. IT WOULD BUILD INCREASED MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHILE PRESERVING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. LESSONS LEARNED IN NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE ONE AGREEMENTS MAY BE USEFUL IN NEGOTIATING PHASE TWO AGREEMENTS. REDUCTIONS WOULD IN EACH PHASE BE SUBSTANTIAL AND
SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09525 01 OF 02 190738Z

SIGNIFICANT, YET NOT SO LARGE AS TO BE UNMANAGEABLE OR INCALCULABLE IN THEIR EFFECTS.

10. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS ACTION WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE US AND SOVIET UNION FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD. US AND SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. REDUCTION OF THE FORCES BELONGING TO THE TWO MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE BOTH A MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED AND, IN NEGOTIATIONS AS COMPLEX AS THESE, THE SIMPLEST.

11. IT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THAT REDUCTIONS BE SUCH AS TO CONTRIBUTE MEANINGFULLY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE STABILITY, FORCES MUST BE REDUCED IN A WAY DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE, REDUCE, OR OFFSET THE MAJOR DISPARITIES MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE EXISTING SITUATION: NAMELY THE SIGNIFICANT DISPARITIES IN

MANPOWER, CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES AND GEOGRAPHY. IN OUR EARLIER PRESENTATIONS, WE EXPLAINED IN GENERAL TERMS HOW WE WOULD PROPOSE, IN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, TO DEAL WITH THESE DISPARITIES. TODAY, I HAVE PROPOSED IN SPECIFIC TERMS HOW TO ELIMINATE, IN AN EQUITABLE WAY THAT MAINTAINS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL, THE DISPARITY IN MANPOWER. I WILL NOW PRESENT OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH DISPARITIES IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES AND IN GEOGRAPHY.

12. THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN TANKS MUST BE DEALT WITH IN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IT IS AN UN-DENIABLE FACT THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS IMBALANCE IN THE NUMBER OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS ON EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS, IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE, AN ARMORED CAPABILITY WHICH BY AN OBJECTIVE MILITARY STANDARD EXCEEDS DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. IN CONCRETE TERMS, THE EASTERN SIDE MAINTAINS 15,500 MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE AREA, WHEREAS THE
SECRET

PAGE 05 VIENNA 09525 01 OF 02 190738Z

WEST MAINTAINS ONLY 6,000. A REDUCTION IN THIS DISPARITY IN ARMORED CAPABILITY IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD GREATER MUTUAL

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09525 02 OF 02 190751Z

15
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

OIC-04 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 AEC-11

AECE-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 /149 W

----- 027714

O R 190705Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 633
SECDEF/WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR/SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 9525

CONFIDENCE AND GREATER STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD HELP MEET A PARTICULAR WESTERN CONCERN. TO THIS END, THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTION AREA A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS, INCLUDING ABOUT 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS WOULD BE ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES OF 460,000 SOLDIERS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THESE FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE USSR AND WOULD NOT BE REPLACED.

13. THE US, FOR ITS PART, WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTION AREA AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL PROPORTION (15 PERCENT) OF ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF 193,000 SOLDIERS IN THE REDUCTION AREA; THAT IS, ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS. THESE FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD NOT BE REPLACED. SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD BE A MEANINGFUL STEP TOWARD A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA, AND A SIGNIFICANT FIRST STEP TOWARD A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, YET NOT SO LARGE A STEP AS TO RISK BEING DESTABILIZING.

14. THESE AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN A MUCH GREATER DIS-
SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09525 02 OF 02 190751Z

TANCE FROM THE REDUCTION AREA THAN WOULD THE SOVIET FORCES. THE EASTERN COAST OF THE UNITED STATES IS MORE THAN 5,000 KILOMETERS FROM THE DIVIDING LINE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHEREAS THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE USSR IS ONLY 650 KILOMETERS OVERLAND FROM THIS LINE. THE RATIO OF THESE DISTANCES IS 8 TO 1, TO THE US DISADVANTAGE. THUS, IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT, BY FAR, TO RETURN THE AMERICAN FORCES -- ONCE WITHDRAWN -- TO THE AREA, THAN IT WOULD BE TO RETURN THE SOVIET SOLDIERS. THE LATTER COULD BE RETURNED OVERLAND FROM THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH ADJOINS THE REDUCTION AREA; THEIR RETURN WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY. US SOLDIERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD BE WITHDRAWN ACROSS AN OCEAN TO ANOTHER CONTINENT. THUS US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE EQUATED BY ANY SIMPLE FORMULA. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY IS SO GREAT THAT EQUITY AND THE CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY REQUIRE THAT IT BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ORDER TO HELP OFFSET THIS GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY, US SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AGREED AREA, AS THE US GOVERNMENT MAY DECIDE IN BOTH CASES. THIS APPROACH WOULD BE EQUITABLE; IT WOULD CONFER NO ADVANTAGES ON THE US, GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION'S GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

15. I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FURTHER POINT. IN WITHDRAWING FORCES FROM THE AREA, IT SHOULD BE ENSURED THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER SUCH AS TO DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES. MORE GENERALLY, WITHDRAWALS SHOULD NOT HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS IN EUROPE OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA. I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD, ON BEHALF OF THOSE OF MY COLLEAGUES WHO REPRESENT COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

16. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH MEASURES, WHICH WOULD FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT, WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. THEY WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND INCREASE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THROUGH REDUCING FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MIS-CALCULATION, FOR EXAMPLE THOSE ARISING OUT OF AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS OUTCOME IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE IT WOULD BOTH FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS ON RE-SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09525 02 OF 02 190751Z

DUCTIONS AND MAKE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES MORE EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE IN A DIRECT AND IMPORTANT WAY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIDES -- ONE OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. APPROPRIATE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE ADOPTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

17. BOTH SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE CARRIED OUT AND FAITHFULLY MAINTAINED. ONLY WITH SUCH ASSURANCE CAN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BE ENHANCED AND SUSTAINED. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD, THEREFORE, INCLUDE VERIFICATION MEASURES DESIGNED TO DO THIS, AND TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. AT AN APPROPRIATE LATER STAGE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WILL BE MAKING MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION.

18. SIMILARLY, BOTH SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, ONCE REACHED, ARE NEITHER CIRCUMVENTED NOR UNDERMINED. A REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS TO ENSURE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT. WE WILL ADVANCE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON THIS TOPIC AT A LATER POINT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

19. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD FURTHER REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE AGREED COMMON CEILING.

20. AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WE HAVE ADVANCED TODAY WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT WOULD BE A REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT SECURITY PROBLEMS WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ADDRESS. IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE; IT WOULD PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL CONCERNED. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WOULD BE THE BASIS OF A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT WOULD FULFILL THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE

NEGOTIATIONS AND REPRESENT A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WHICH WE
SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09525 02 OF 02 190751Z

COULD JUSTLY BE PROUD.

21. MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL NOW TABLE THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY BELGIUM, CANADA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS, IN A CONCISE FORM, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESENTATION I HAVE JUST MADE TO YOU. WE LOOK FORWARD TO MUTUAL DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL IN THE COMING PERIOD WITH A VIEW TO AGREEMENT. WE HAVE NOTED YOUR PROPOSALS, AND ARE GIVING THEM CAREFUL STUDY. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.
END TEXT.HUMES

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 12 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MBFR, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: mcintyresh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973VIENNA09525
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731168/abqcelnl.tel
Line Count: 344
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: mcintyresh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <23-Aug-2001 by mcintyresh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: TEXT OF PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE PROPOSALS BY US REPRESENTATIVE
TAGS: PARM, US, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO NATO
BONN
LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005